By Stan Gudmuncson
Peterson, MN
When the Air Force retired the SR-71s in late 1989, Congress required that there be a follow-on replacement. Sure enough, the Air Force brass said and we’ve even identified the first Air Force pilot to fly that aircraft. He was the pilot I was flying SR-71s with. Because the follow-on wasn’t anything like the SR-71 and much more like the U-2, to prepare for that assignment, he transitioned to the U-2 program.
But the Air Force cancelled the SR-71 replacement and they didn’t notify Congress. That really irritated some powerful senators. That’s not something you do not do even if you are four-star general. Consequently, Congress said you are bringing the SR-71 back to operational status.
I don’t know what the Air Force leadership’s response was exactly but they certainly didn’t like it. Actually, there is Bible passage which probably describes their reaction best. “For lo, there was great weeping and gnashing of teeth.”
Initially, the plan was to field a small squadron but we ended up with two A-models. Because NASA had A-models, the pilot training B-model, and the simulator at the Dryden Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, 9th Reconnaissance Wing’s Detachment 2 stood-up there. Edwards AFB was happy to have us and provided a hangar and office space closest to Dryden.
Reconstitution began in the fall of 1994. The program ended sometime in 1999. Our final flight, however, was in October 97 when a Clinton line-item-veto ended flight operations. From then on, the rest of the effort involved getting rid of parts and components and destroying things like 30-plus perfectly serviceable engines. They ended up in a car crusher.
Lockheed was selected as the prime contractor of course. They began refurbishment of two A-models at Palmdale, not very far from Edwards. Initially, Det 2’s three pilots and three RSOs weren’t checked out to fly. Consequently, NASA pilots and flight engineers flew the first Functional Check Flights (FCFs).
Our first crew was mission ready in September 1995 and the second in November 1995. Because all of the crewmembers were fairly senior Lt Cols, we hired two more crews. One crew got as far as flying a solo sortie. The pilot of the second crew showed up on the day our program was terminated. The RSO candidate had his orders cancelled and never came to Edwards. Both of the new pilot hires ended up going to the U-2 program.
Between November 1994 and October 1997, what did we accomplish? Quite a lot actually. Our two A-model aircraft were significantly superior to the aircraft retired in 1989.
First, our airplanes were much more survivable. We fielded a new and far more capable Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) System. And we modified our tactics. Flying across a western test range against the latest and greatest known threat, we broke their system. It took them two weeks to repair. We were invited to not come back.
Second, instead of cameras with film that needed a lot of time to download, develop and analyze, our sensors were digital. The Advanced Synthetic Aperture (ASARs) system, previously fielded, had been significantly improved. Second, the side looking Technical Objective Cameras (TEOCs) had been digitized with an electro-optical system. Third, we added a downlink capability that provided near real-time reconnaissance that was compatible with Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force systems.
During our short operation, there were more than six requests for the SR-71 from theater commanders. The most amazing one came from the White House. They asked us to fly sorties into the Middle East. That request came after the White House had already line-item-vetoed our program. We were wanted but the Air Force did not want us.
Why was our program cancelled in 1989 and why were we terminated in 1997. It had absolutely nothing to do with our reconnaissance capability or our survivability or other platforms that could (not) do what we did. Also, it had little to do with cost. “Official” Air Force explanations are largely phony evasions. The cynic’s view is that the SR-71 program was terminated twice, mostly because of fragile fighter-pilot egos.
Why do I know anything about this? I was the commander of Det 2.
Michael Parks says
Excellent read and perspective, Col. G. It’s refreshing to know the Blackbird reactivation produced solid results and she retired with her head held high. As the KC-10 is also being retired with no real replacement in sight I’m reminded of the Blackbird program and the AF’s chronic lack of foresight.
I attended the 1997 Beale Air Fest, and your memory is spot-on! The crowd line extended to the parallel taxiway, so when 971 taxied to park she passed by essentially all the show attendees. What an energy! I was also lucky enough to catch the start (x2), taxi, and takeoff the next day at the barn she was kept in. Along with pics of the show and the departure I even have one of you, Col. G., as you walked around 971’s nose before start. They’re digitized, and would be happy to send them to you if you’d like.
James C. Goodall says
As a military historian and a published author, I understand how and why the Blackbirds were put to rest long before their time.
In 1985, General Jerry O’Malley was the Air Force Chief of Staff and strongly supported the Blackbird. He was the first Air Force pilot to fly the very first SR-71 Blackbird over enemy territory, North Vietnam. General O’Malley loved the Blackbird and all the maintenance crews who built, supported, and flew “Kelly’s Black Jet.”
On 20 APR 1985, the first Air Force officer to fly an operational mission in an SR-71 was killed in a plane crash that also killed his wife and two other military officers.
His next in command was his Deputy Chief of Staff (AFCS), General Larry Welch. General Welch did not have the same warm and fuzzy feelings toward the SR-71 that General O’Malley did. The reason? Welch was turned down to fly the SR-71 when he was a major because he was not that good of a pilot. That was a requirement to be considered for the prestigious position of a crew member of the world’s fastest operational aircraft.
The pain of losing out on flying the SR-71 was a bitter pill Welch had difficulty swallowing. His first order of business once he took over as an Air Force Chief of Staff was to do everything he could to kill the program. He sent a memo stating that if anyone under his command said anything negative about the Blackbirds, he was okay with that. However, anyone from the lowly E-1 Airman Basic to the O-10 general level would have to live with the repercussions to their careers.
So, pulling every string and favor he could, Welch effectively killed the Blackbirds. The Russians, the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, and the Israelis couldn’t shoot one down using their best pilots and a second-rate general, who wasn’t good enough to take control of a plane that moves through the air at 3,400 feet per second, or two miles every three-seconds took down the entire fleet. The last operational SR-71 flew on 09 March 90, six months before Saddam invaded his neighbor.
To make matters worse, during the beginning of Desert Shield, the Air Force contacted the Skunk Works in early September and asked what it would take to have one SR-71A reactivated and operationally ready for the upcoming war in Iraq. It took Ben R. Rich, then President of Lockheed Skunk Works, about ten days to have an answer.
Ben told the Air Force that he needed a gold-plated authorization letter to cut through all the red tape, a blank check, access to all sensors, Air Force support and electronics, storage, and his pick of operational pilots and ground crew. Once the “Go” was given, he guaranteed the Blackbird would be fully operationally ready in 15 days.
The Air Force told Ben to hold that, though. About a month later, they got back to Ben. They asked what it would take to have a second SR-71 ready. Ben said he already had the answer: 30 days to start operational readiness.
It’s now late October/early November 1990, finally, after waiting over 70 days for a reply as to when Lockheed could expect the ‘Go-a-head’ to reactivate two SR-71s. He was told, and he told me in a meeting I had with him after he retired, that since the program was canceled due to the total lack of support at the Air Force Chief of Staff’s office, reinstating the Blackbirds now would make the AFCS, that be Welch, look bad.
So much for waving Old Glory and petty backstabbing by the Jack Ass that was the reason the program was killed; he should be charged with treason, found guilty, and executed, but not necessarily in that order.
Cheers….MSgt Jim Goodall, USAF (ret)
Mark Coleman says
What a great blast from my past. From 1992-1994, I was the Director of Curriculum Development and a ground school instructor for the U-2 Program at Beale AFB (“Blue Suiters” did this stuff back then). It was during this time that I was asked to manage the “resurrection” of the SR-71 curriculum. My involvement was slight compared to yours, obviously, but I was very pleased and proud to have even a remote connection to such a historical program and aircraft. I got to know some of the pilots who transitioned through 1RS before, during, or after the SR71 standup. Beale benefitted from an SR’s fly-in at our airshow around that time, and we occasionally had our windows rattled on base by an overflight from Edwards. I was sorry to see the final nail go into the SR’s coffin. I later went on to be the Executive Officer of the 99th at Beale before moving to the other end of the operational spectrum in the world of A/OA-10 operations…. I transitioned from working with operators above 70,000 feet to those operating below 500 AGL. I was beyond fortunate to have the experiences I had at Beale.
Stanley James Gudmundson says
Mark, thanks much for your interest and for your help. Here’s a story about our last airshow at Beale in Sep 97. Rather than fly in the day before, Gil Luloff and Jim Greenwood flew in the day of the airshow. They arrived about noon and started with a throttles at idle ‘whisper pass’ down the runway. The next pass was a ‘non-whisper’ pass. After a little airshow they taxied in and parked in a roped off area just to west of the old 99RS and 1RS squadron building (1086). The airshow crowd was huge and it seemed like everyone wanted to get as near as possible to the SR. When they parked, shut down, and opened the canopies simultaneously the crowd was completely quiet. Then there began a murmur which turned into a roar. Sent shivers up my spine. Jim and Gil stayed in their pressure suits. The rest of the SR guys and Jim and Gil then walked the ropes talking to folks and signing autographs. The Thunderbirds were scheduled to start their routine at 1500 hours (3 p.m.) but the crowd had thinned considerably. The 9RW wing commander, BGen Simpson, had been a Thunderbird pilot and was its former commander. Stan, he said, if you would have told me that another airplane would or could upstage the Thunderbirds, I wouldn’t have believed you. Today, he said, I’m a believer. We always left an impression. Again, thank-you. Stan Gudmundson